NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 9 | Number 1

Article 27

12-1-1930

Negligence -- Automobiles -- Duty of Guest
Mills Scott Benton

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Mills S. Benton, Negligence -- Automobiles -- Duty of Guest, 9 N.C. L. Rev. 98 (1930).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol9/iss1/27

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
elements," without them the marriage is voidable, 12 unless it is ratified by consummation. 13
The cases preponderate in favor of annulment of marriages contracted in jest.14 Social policy dictates that a contract of such importance to the race shall not be unintentionally assumed. Where it
appears that the parties never had the intention of fulfilling the
obligations of the contract, it would seem to be more just to both the
state and to the parties to restore them to statu qua.
C. E. REITZEL.

Negligence-Automobiles--Duty of Guest
Two actions (consolidated by consent) were brought against the
owner of an automobile and his wife, who was driving, to recover
damages for personal injuries sustained by a guest, and caused by
the alleged negligence of the driver while operating the car. Judgment against the wife was sustained, the court holding that the
owner was relieved of any liability by the finding of the jury that
his wife was not operating the car as his agent. Testimony of caution by the guest to the driver was held competent on the question
of the driver's negligence.'
The above statement of the owner's liability raises serious doubt
in view of the court's previous adoption of the "family purpose"
doctrine. 2 There is no indication that the court is overruling the
previous holding of modifying the doctrine, although the language
would seem to restore the owner's liability to an agency basis.3
The testimony as to the warning is admissible either to show a
compliance with the guest's duty to warn, if any, 4 or as evidence

tending to show negligence on the part of the driver.,

Such a state-

' Crouch v. Wartenberg, supra note 9.
" McClurg v. Terry, spra note 10; Hall v. Hail, 24 Times L. P, 756
( 8rook e v. Brooke, 60 Md. 524 (1883) ; Macri v. Macri, 164 N. Y. Supp.
112, 177 App. Div. 292 (1917); Arado v.Arado, 281 Ill.
123, 117 N. E. 816,
4 A. L. R. 28 (1917); Martin v. Otis, 233 Mass. 491, 124 N. E. 294 (1919);
Americus Co. v. Coleman, 16 Ga. App. 17, 84 S. E. 493 (1915).
14

Note (1921) 11 A. L. R. 215.

'Teasley etal. v. Burwell et al., 199 N. C. 18, 153 S.E. 607 (1930).
'Goss v. Williams, 196 N. C. 213, 145 S. E. 119 (1928); (1927) 5 N. C.
L. Rav. 252; (1928) 6 N. C. L. IEv. 78; McCall, The Family Automobile
(1930) 8 N. C. L. Rsv. 256.
'Linville v. Nissen, 162 N. C. 96, 77 S. E. 1096 (1913) ; Tyree v Tudor,
183 N. C. 340, 111 S. E. 714 (1922); Watts v. Lefler, 190 N. C. 722, 130 S. E.
630 (1925).
'McAdd v. Shea, 10 La. App. 733, 122 So. 879 (1929).

'Hiller v. De Sautels, 169 N. E. 494 (Mass. 1929).

NOTES AND COMMENTS
ment is not hearsay, for it is offered, not to prove the truth of the
facts asserted, but merely to show that the assertion was made.
The rulings relative to the duty which a guest in an automobile
must discharge to entitle him to sue his host or a negligent third
party, 6 range all the way from holding that he must exercise a degree of care coextensive with that of the driver 7 to holding that he
must remain silent and passive. 8 Between these two extremes lie
more moderate interpretations of the duty to exercise ordinary care
under the circumstances. 9 Opposite theories exist as to his duty to
maintain a lookout. A New York holding10 denies recovery to a
guest who failed to keep a lookout at a railroad crossing, while an
Oregon case11 permits a guest to recover, although he gave the driver
a mistaken direction. The application of this question is often resolved into the issue of whether the guest may read,1 2 sleep, 13 or
converse. 14 Even though the duty to keep a lookout may be denied,
'McGeever v. O'Byrne, 203 Ala. 266, 82 So. 508 (1919).

'Read v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 219 N. Y. 660, 114 N. E. 1081
(1915).
"Alost v. J. Moock Wood and Drayage Co., Inc., 10 La, App. 57, 120 So.
791 (1929); Lawrason v. Richard, 129 So. 250 (La. 1930); Bolton v. Wells,
225 N. W. 791 (N. D. 1929); Telling Belle Vernon Co. v. Krenz, 34 Ohio
App. 499, 171 N. E. 357 (1928); Schlossstein v. Bernstein, 293 Pa. 245, 142
Atl. 324 (1928); Yturria v. Everton, 4 S. W. (2d) 210 (Tex. 1928); see
Southern Pacific Co. v. Wright, 248 Fed. 261, 264 (C. C. A. 9th, 1918).
' Wicker v. Scott, 29 F. (2d) 807 (C. C. A. 6th, 1928) ; McDermott v. Sibert,
218 Ala. 670, 119 So. 681 (1928) ; Graves v. Jewel Tea Co., 23 S. W. (2d) 972
(Ark. 1930); Switzler v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 285 Pac. 918 (Cal.
1930) ; Fairchild v. Detroit, G. H. & M. Ry. Co., 250 Mich. 252, 230 N. W. 167
(1930); Lewis v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 17 S. W. (2d) 359 (Mo.
1929); Hocking Valley Ry. Co. v. Wykle, 122 Ohio St. 391, 171 N. E. 860
(1930).
"Read v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., supra note 7. Accord: Norfolk & W.
Ry. Co. v. Wellons' Adm'r., 154 S. E. 575 (Va. 1930).
Peters v. Johnson, 264 Pac. 459 (Ore. 1928).
Kilpatrick v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 290 Pa. 288, 138 Atl. 830
(1927) (Held not to be contributory negligence for guest to be reading a
paper, though the automobile was on the trolley track).
Oppenheim v. Barkin, 159 N. E. 628 (Mass. 1928) (Held contributory
negligence for guest to sleep, knowing driver had been without sleep for a long
time); Krueger v. Krueger, 197 Wis. 588, 222 N. W. 784 (1929) (same, knowing driver had been subjected to extreme hardships). But in the absence of
special circumstances it is generally held that the mere fact that the guest
was asleep does not constitute contributory negligence. Bushnell v. Bushnell,
103 Conn. 583, 131 Atl. 432, 44 A. L. R. 785 (1925); McAndrews v. Leonard,
134 Atl. 710 (Vt. 1926).
" Semellie v. Southern Pacific Co., 269 Pac. 657 (Cal. 1928) (guest held
contributorily negligent when he said at railroad crossing, "it's all clear; let's
go," and an accident ensued); McAdd v. Shea, supra note 4 (statement by
guest, "it is pretty fast for a new car," held to relieve him of contributory negligence) ; Peters v. Johnson, supra note 11 (guest allowed to recover although
he mistakenly directed driver).
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there is a clear duty to warn of perceived dangers 1 or violations of
the law, 18 unless the driver appears to be aware of the same or striv7
ing to avoid them.'
In actions by a guest against the host, the guest assumes the risk
of defects, not known to the host.' 8 In actions either against the
host or negligent third parties, the guest assumes the dangers incident to the known incompetency or inexperience' 9 or habits2 0 of the

driver. All the authorities are to the effect that it is contributory
negligence, precluding recovery, for one to ride knowingly with an
intoxicated driver, if he is injured as a result of the driver's negligence. 2 ' Whether or not the passenger knew of the driver's condition is a question for the jury.22 A guest is also bound by his
acquiescence in obvious negligence or recklessness in handling the
car,2 3 and he assumes the risks naturally incident to the purpose and
24
character of the trip.
The various factual aspects which bring up the general question
suggest the inadvisability of crystallized rules. It is impractical to
try to limit the duty of a guest to exercise due care under the circumstances by any fixed rules of law. To attempt to lay down any
rule requiring a guest to give warning would undoubtedly prove in'Minnich v. Easton Transit Co., 267 Pa. 200, 110 Atl. 273, 18 A. L. R,
296 (1920) ; Kilpatrick v. Phila. Rapid Transit Co., supra note 12.
"Renner v. Tone, Rec'r., 273 Pa. 10, 116 Atl. 512 (1922) (driving on wrong
side of street against the current of traffic) ; Wagenbauer v. Schwinn, 285 Pa.
128, 131 Atl. 699 (1926) (driving recklessly and in disregard of circumstances) ; Morningstar v. Northeast Pennsylvania R. Co., 290 Pa. 14, 137 Atl.
800 (1927) (crossing railroad track without stopping) ; Alperdt v. Paige, 292
Pa. 1, 140 Atl. 555 (1928) (driving in front of a rapidly approaching automobile which has the right of way).
'United States Can Co. v. Ryan, 39 F. (2d) 445 (C. C. A. 8th, 1930);
Jerko v. Buffalo R. & P. Ry. Co., 275 Pa. 459, 119 Atl. 543 (1923).
"Lewellyn v. Shott, 155 S. E. 115 (W. Va. 1930); O'Shea v. Lavoy, 175
Wis. 456, 185 N. W. 525, 20 A. L. R. 1008 (1921).
"Cleary v. Eckhart, 191 Wis. 114, 210 N. W. 267, 51 A. L. R. 576 (1926);
Thomas v. Steppert, 228 N. W. 513 (Wis. 1930).
" Livaudias v. Black, 127 So. 129 (La. 1930).
'Lynn v. Goodwin, 170 Cal. 112, 148 Pac. 927, L. R. A. 1915 E, 588
(1915) ; Kirmse v. Chicago, T. H. & S. E. Ry. Co., 73 Ind. App. 537, 127 N. E.
837 (1920); Winston Adm'r. v. City of Henderson, 179 Ky. 220, 200 S. W.
330, L. R. A. 1918 C, 646 (1918) ; Jensen v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. ct al.,
133 Wash. 208, 233 Pac. 635 (1925). To the effect that voluntary intoxication
does not relieve of contributory negligence, see Schwartz v. Johnson, 152 Tenn.
586 , 280 S. W. 32 (1926).
"Fitzpatrick v. Civitis, 139 At]. 639 (Conn. 1927).
' Joyce v. Brockett, 237 N. Y. 561, 143 N. E. 743 (1923) ; Hill v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 271 Pa. 232, 114 Atl. 634 (1921) ; Krause v. Hall, 195
Wis. 565, 217 N. W. 290 (1928).
, Sommerfield v. Flury, 198 Wis. 163, 223 N. W. 408 (1929).
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advisable. Experience tells us that back seat suggestions as to the
handling of a car are disconcerting and irritating to the driver (more
so as between husband and wife). Indeed this is one case where
silence is generally golden. At present the cases seem to make no
distinction between the liability of a host and that of a third party.
The burdens of generosity should not be so great. It is submitted
that the legislature should relieve the situation by a statutory change,
and thereby relieve the host of part of his present burden. 25
MILLS SCOTT BENTON.
Procedure and Practise-Relation Between Survival and
Wrongful Death Statutes Where Death
Follows Injury
Two recent decisions construing the North Carolina survival'
and wrongful death 2 statutes have aroused speculation as to what
actions for personal injuries survive to the personal representative.
In both cases the decedent was injured by the defendant's alleged
negligence. In the state case3 decedent died before the termination
of his suit, but did not die from the injuries sustained by the defendant's negligence. In the federal case 4 the jury found that the
decedent was injured by the defendant's negligence, and awarded
damages, but found, also, that the decedent's death was not caused
by the injuries inflicted by the defendant's negligence. In these cases
it was held that the cause of action for personal injuries not resulting
in death survived.
At common law no right of action for personal injuries survived
:he death of the injured or injuring party. Our survival statute5
provides that all causes of action survive except those specifically
declared not to survive. Since the amendment 6 of our survival statute, it is now clear that if the injured party dies without a recovery,
compromise, or settlement, and not as a result of the defendant's
negligence, the cause of action survives. 7 Also, the cause of action
'For discussion of proposed statute to meet this situation, see p. 47.
N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1927) §§159, 162, 163.
Ibid., §§160, 161.
'Fuquay, Adm'x v. A. & W. R. R. Co., 199 N. C. 499 (1930).
'James Baird Co., Inc., v. Boyd, 41 F. (2d) 578 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930).
1
2

'Supra note 1.
REv. (1905) §157 (2), as amended by N. C. Pun. LAvs (1915), c. 38.
Infra note 16.
'Fuquay, Adm'x v. A. & W. R. R. Co., supra note 3; cf. Bolick v. R. R.
Co., 138 N. C. 370, 50 S. E. 689 (1905).

